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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
LLOYD OLSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALDlTS D. CHAPPELL, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
S11 ATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by Plaintiff on a promissory note 
to recover $4,523.92 plus costs of court. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Th~ case was tried to the Court sitting with a jury. 
The jury returned answers to special interrogatories 
in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff. The Trial 
Court gave judgment for the Plaintiff notwithstanding 
the jury's answers to the special interrogatories. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent, hereinafter referred to as 
Respondent, seeks affirmance of the Judgment of the 
Trial Court. 
·) 
~TATK\I KNT OF FAC'l'~ 
RPspondPnt di:·mgTPe,..; with Appellant's Statement 
of tl1P Fads: submits that Appellant's Statement of 
the Fads is materially deficient; and respectfully in. 
vites this H onorahle Court's attention to the record in 
the particulars: 
( )ne Clark .J. ()bra>· (hereinafter referred to a8 
'' Ohra>· ''), in the spnng or sulllmer of l~l63, became 
interPstPd in O}Jening a ''Dog n Suds'' drive-inn in 
Layton, l~tah, and entered into negotiations with .John 
P. OlsPn (hereinafter referred to as "Olsen") to pm-
chasP C'ertain equipment to he used in the proposed , 
operation. (Tr 6G) Ohray interested Appellant in the 
drivP-inn as an investment: and in October or Nov- , 
PillllPr of 1963 in the Ro>·al Baker:-·. Logan, Ptah, Obray, 
Oben, and Appellant had an exploratory meeting. (Tr. , 
-Hi and 47) 
From the time of this meeting until July of 1964, 
the date on which Olsen and Appellant next met, (Tr. 
48, Lines 29 and 30; Tr. 49, Line 1) there were, accord-
ing to Appellant's testimony, two telephone convers-
ations between Olsen and Appellant. (Tr. 51, Line 30 
and Tr. fi3, Lines 3-21) The record is barren of any 
further contact, written or oral, between Olsen and 
Appellant until Appellant was served a Summons in 
this matter, at \\·hich tillle Ap}Jellant called Olsen. (Tr. 
:\G, LinPs 12-1-1- and Tr. :'!8. Lines 7-12) 
In the interval between the October or November 
meeting mentioned above and the second telephone con-
versation between Appellant and Olsen, (Tr. 53) the 
Appellant and Obray executed the note sued upon. (Tr. 
6, lines 22-24; Tr. 7, lines 6 and 7) The note's execution 
iR admitted. (Supra.} The consideration for the note 
were the items of personalty listed on Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit 3, and a Bill of Sale to said items wa.s given from 
Olsen to Obray and Appellant. (Tr. 14, 15, and 16) 
The items of property were delivered to Obray. (Tr. 
73-78) Appellant at page two of his Brief points out that 
Appellant and Obray "as partners" executed the note 
but overlooked the full context from which "as part-
ners'' was extracted. That full context is as follow.s: 
''Clark J. Obray and Aldus D. Chappell, as 
Partners of Logan, Utah, and individually ... " 
(emphasis added) 
Appellant knew that a condition of the note was that 
it be executed by him "individually." (Tr. 48, lines 
19-29) Subse4uent to its execution, Appellant delivered 
it to Obray; (Tr. 49, lines 24-28) and Obray delivered 
the note to Olsen. (Tr. 68,.line3 13-20) 
Thereafter, (Ti·. 69, lines 5-14) Appellant came 
to Obray's home and advised him he wanted to "with-
draw from the Partnership and have nothing more to 
do with it;" (Tr. 69, lines 22 and 23; Tr. 51, lines 3-9) 
and all interest of Appellant in the Partnership was 
acquired by Obray. (R. 92, lines 29 and 30 and R. 93, 
lines 1 and 2) Oben was not advised that A-rJpellam 
had withdrmrn from the Partnership until advised of the 
faet hy Obray at a date subi-lequent to the resale by 
Ohra~· of the equipment purchased by Obray and Ap-
pellant from Olsen. (Tr. 70) Appellant never did advise 
01:-wn of the termination of the Partnership. (Tr. 63, 
linPs 7-17) 
ln the .July, 1964 meeting between Appellant and 
Olsen, according to Appellant's testimony, Olsen told 
Appellant " ... that Obray had sold it and that he 
had made $6,000 cash on the deal and that I (Appel-
lant-sic) was very foolish to have gotten out of this 
deal and not been participating in the profits that he'd 
made.'' (Tr. 64, lines 7-12) Olsen gave Appellant no 
in di ca ti on on this conversation that Appellant had 
been released from liahilitv on the note. (Tr. 64, lines 
2;)-28 and Tr. 65) 
Obray sold the La:·ton Dog n Suds drive-inn with-
out ever having operated it at a profit of approx-
imate!~- $8,000.00 (Tr. 89, lines 15-17, Tr. 91) to one 
Groves. (Tr. 92, lines 26-28) 
The Appellant stipulated that Respondent is the 
owner of the note. (Tr. 6, lines 22-30 and Tr. 7, lines 
6 and 7) Payments on the note, all of which were made 
hy Groves, totaled $650.00: (Tr. 14) and the payments 
wPre applied to tlw note leaving an admitted balance 
of $-til2~.92, the amount pra~·ed in the Complaint (R. 1) 
and the amount for which judgment was granted. (R. 
41 and 42) 
ARGlTMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PRO-
PERLY WITHIN ITS PREROGATIVE AND COR-
RECTLY AWARDED JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE JURY'S ANSWERS 
TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, AND THERE 
IS NO BASIS IN FACT FOR FINDING A MODIFI-
CATION OF THJ1j PROMISSORY NOTE SUED 
lTPON BY PLAINTIFF. 
Appellant has no argument with the general pro-
position that: 
'•A special finding by the jury is binding on, 
and may not be ignored or disregarded by the 
court, provided it is relevant and material to 
the issues, warranted by the evidence and does 
not contain an unwarranted conclusion of law, 
and has not heen set aside on proper grounds.'' 
(89 C.J.S. 344) 
However, in orde~ for the jury verdict to stand, 
it must be supported hy some competent evidence. 
The jury verdict iri the instant case was not sup-
ported by competent evidence and, in fact, was con-
trary to the express testimony of the Appellant. When 
being cross examined, Mr. Chappell testified as follows: 
Q. (by Mr. Hoggan) . . . Have you at any 
time received a release of your liabilit}' on thi~ 
promissory note? 
"\. No, Sir. Not written. 
Q. \Vell, do you claim to have received a rp_ 
lease of any kind? 
A. Yes, I felt when I discussed with Clark--
Q. Not what you felt, but do you claim to have 
received a release of any kind? 
A. A verbal release, yes. 
Q. Who from'? 
A. Mr. Obray. 
Q. Have you at any time ever received a re-
lease from Mr. Olsen? 
A. No, Sir. 
Q. Or from anyone acting m his behalf? 
A. No. 
Q. Or from System Finance Company? 
A. No. 
Q. Or from thf> Plaintiff in this action? 
A. No. 
Not withstanding this unequivocal testimony by 
the Appellant, the jury found an amendment to the 
note consisting of a deletion of Appellant's name there-
from. (R. 36) This course of conduct the jury said 
consisted of four elements. They are: 
l. The conversation on the street between Plain-
tiff and Defandant, in which the Plaintiff in 
7 
effeet ex1uessed knowledge that the Defendant 
was not a member of the partnership. (R. 37) 
This finding hy the jury presumably has reference 
to the conversation between Olsen and Appellant in 
.July of 1964 and not between Appellant and Respon-
dent. The record of Appellant's testimony on this con-
versation (Tr. 64, lines 2-15) shows that what Olsen 
in fact did was to chide Appellant for getting out of 
the partnership. Nothing in that conversation could 
lw ronstrued as an intimation by Olsen that Appellant 
was released on the note. 
This eonversation is analagous to the situation 
where two men "as partners and individually" borrow 
money to buy a common stock. One withdraws from the 
partnership and the other stays in. The stock goes up 
and the man who stays in makes a profit. But does 
the fact that the one man withdrew from the partner-
ship relieve him of obligations incurred in borrowing 
mone~' during the existance of the partnership in the 
absence of an express release? Respondent submits 
not. 'rhe continuation or severence of the relationship 
between Chappell and Ohray was a matter of their per-
sonal concern. What they did or did not do to settle 
their affairs with each other cannot affect a debt in-
curred during the partnership as partners in the absence 
of an express release from the creditor. Appellant 
admits to n0n1 r having reePived such a release. 
.t\I oreover, thi8 eonversation is vague and indefinite 
at very best on the question of whether Appellant was 
released. It has efficacy, if at all, only in what Appel-
lant in this own mind made of it. In this connection 
the Court's attention is invited to 17 Am. J ur. 2nd 
on Contracts, Section 465 on Modification at page 935 
when• thP author states: 
"The mental purpose of one of the parties to 
a contract cannot change its terms, nor are inde-
finite expressions sufficient to establish a bindinq 
agreement to change the formal requirement~ 
of a u:ritten contract." (emphasis added) 
Also, in the case of Cruse v. Clawson (Montana) 
352 P2d 989, there is this significant statement at 
page 994: 
· · H owe1:er, mutital cancellation must be clearly 
expressed and shown, and acts and conduct of 
the parties to be sufficent must be clear, con-
rincing, and inconsistent with the existence of 
the contract.'' (emphasis added) 
As a second element in the alleged course of con-
duct. the jury found: 
2. The correspondence written by the Plaintiff 
in regards to payment of the business debts, be-
cause of lack of reference to the Defendant as 
heing joinaly responsible, is sufficient evidence 
in our minds that the Plaintiff agreed to the 
deletion of the Defendant's name from the con-
tract. ( R. 37) 
It is pertinent to observe that the Court asked 
the Jury: 
lj 
~)(a). Did Plaintiff and Clark J. Obray, by any 
coursp of conduct of which Defendant was made 
muuf, ever inform Defendant in .substance and 
effect that the note now sued on was amended 
by deleting defendant's name therefrom? ( empha-
sis added) ( R. 36) 
Appellant in presentation of his evidence laid 
great stress on the point that he was totally unaware 
of any dealings and correspondence between Olsen 
and Ohray. (See testimon~' of Appellant Tr. 54-55 and 
the testimony of Obray Tr. 78 and 83) 
lt sePrns inconsistent to say that Appellant was 
unaware of anything which transpired between Olsen 
and Obray; to testify himself that he had no dealings 
with Olsen after he told him he was out of the partner-
ship; (Tr. 58) and yet, in the face of all this, say that 
the jur~· 's finding that there was a course of conduct 
''of which Defendant was aware" (R. 36 Interrogatory 
No. 3(a) ) is based on competent evidence. 
ThP jun· 's third and fourth findings on a course 
of conduct ( R. 37) can hP treated together. They are: 
:5. The transfer of the franchise from the Plain-
tiff to Clark Obray, without the Defendant's 
name heing placed upon it. 
-!. The fact that Clark Obray sold the business 
without the Defendant's participation in any 
way is in our opinion a course of action which 
would inform the Defendant that hi.;; name was 
rleleted from the contract. 
]() 
\\'hen the App€llant withdrew from his partnership 
with Ohray, Obray acquired all interest of Appellant 
in the equipment which was consideration for the note 
.sued UJjOn. ( &w the testimony of Obray Tr. 92, lines 
29 and 30, and Tr. 93, lines 1-6) Obray sold the equip-
ment and business in which it was installed without 
(:)Ver having operated it but after his partnership with 
Appellant was terminated. (Tr. 92, lines 26-27) 
Inasmuch as Obray, upon termination of the part-
nership with Appellant, acquired the property rights 
and interests of Appellant, it is entirely consistent 
for Olsen (presumably the person ref erred to in the 
jury's answer as Plaintiff) to have dealt entirely with 
Obray. Obray simply sold what he owned himself, and 
the fact that Appellant was not consulted could hardly 
he characterized as a course of conduct ''. . . of which 
Defendant was aware" and which released Appellant 
on the note. 
In addition, Appellant testified that when demand 
was made upon him for payment by System Finance 
Company, he sent the notices to Obray with notation, 
"I, of course, am not involved in this situation. Will 
~Tou please have me taken off." (Tr. 55) Appellant 
acknowledges by the statement ''. . . have me taken 
off,'' that he was on. Appellant also testified that he 
never advised Olsen of the termination of the partner-
ahip (Tr. 63. lines 14-17) and that Olsen never did 
T 
I 
! 
1 I 
an~·thing to indicate to ,\ppellant that Appellant was 
not being held liable on the note. (Tr. 65, lines 15-26) 
rrl1e 11 rial Court, after reflecting on all of the 
evidence, was led to conclude: 
'11 HE CO-CRT: l think that the Court has car-
ried in its mind all the way through was not 
any question about inconsistencies in the an-
swers by the triers of the fact, but the fact that 
there was insufficient facts to Justify the Court 
e1:er sitbmitting it to the jury. (emphasis added) 
(Tr. 129-130) 
The case of Majerus vs. Guelsow, Minn. 113 N.vV. 
2d ±50, cited by Appellant at page eight of his Brief gives 
ample authority to the Court for entering judgment 
for Plaintiff in this case, notwithstanding the jury's 
findings. 
11he law on the subject of modification of con-
tracts is well stated in 17 Am. Jur.2nd on Contracts 
under the section titled "~1odification" at page 93;), 
8ection 4ti5, where we read: 
·'To be effective as a modification, the new 
agreement must possess all the elements neces-
sary to form a contract. A modification of a 
contract requires the assent of both, or all, 
parties to the contract. Mutual assent is as much 
a requisite element in effecting a contractual 
modification as it is in the initial creation of 
a contract. 
'' 11he mental purpose of one of the parties to 
a eontract eannot ehan.ge ibi terms. nor are 
l :2 
indefinite expressions sufficient to establish 
a binding agreement to change the . formal re. 
quirements of a written contract. A request 
suggestion, or proposal of alteration or modi 
ication, made after an unconditional acceptance 
of an off er, and not assented to by the oppositf' 
party, does not affect the contract then in force 
ahd effect hy r<>ason of the acceptance. One 
reeeiving an off er to change a contract to whieh 
he is a party is held to be under no obligation 
to answer it; and his silence cannot be construed 
as an acceptance where nothing else is shown. 
Mere negotations between the parties will not 
suffice to produce a modification. Before that 
result can be accomplished, the negotiations 
must ripen into a mutual, 1lalid, and enforceable 
a.nreement to modify the old contract." (emphasis 
added) 
Counsel for Respondent submits that there is no-
thing in the record to establish, either by word or 
conduct, a '' ... mutual assent ... '' to its modification 
by release of Defendant from liability. 
The closest Utah case in point which counsel has 
.been able to locate is Green v. Garn, 11 Ut. 2d 375, 
359 P2d 1050. In that ease, Green sold a business to 
Garn . and as part of the consideration for the sale 
took a promissory note for $5,000. Garns were unable 
to make a go of the business, and Green told them if 
they would list the property through him, he would 
make certain concessions on a sale, including release 
:_0£ ·Garns when a new contract was negotiated. Garns 
did not list throu~h Greens hut rather sold the business 
13 
through another broker to Messers. Burrows, Jensen, 
and Payne. Burrows, Jensen, and Payne defaulted, 
and Garns sued them. Green filed a suit in interven-
tion and claimed the $10,000 which Burrows, Jensen, 
and Payne owed Garns. 
Garns argued that smce Green claimed against 
Burrows, Jensen, and Payne, he had released Garns. 
This argument is analogous to the argument of Appel-
lant that he was released because Olsen attempted 
to collect from and dealt with Obray. The Utah Court 
at page 1053 said: 
"The fact that he (Green) was willing to accept 
and claimed the right to receive payment of 
$10,000 from Burrows, Jensen, and Payne does 
not discharge the obligation of the Garns ... '' 
Garn further argued that the conduct of Green 
in surrendering possession to Garn who in turn sur-
rendered possession to Burrows, Jensen, and Payne 
was conduct amounting to abandonment by Green of 
his rights against Garn. This is analogous to Appel-
lant's claim that Obray's conduct in taking possession 
and operating the equipment amounted to a release 
by Olsen of Appellant and an acceptance of Obray. 
The Utah Court observed at page 1053: 
''But it does not follow from the Garn 's · sur-
render of the premises that Green surrendered 
his rights." 
14 
TliP Court thPn statt>d that tlw: 
· · ... offer of Ureen to allow the Garns to try 
to work out smne means to help their predic~­
rnent certain!~- cannot be construed as an aban-
donment of his rights under his contract with 
them."' ( Ihid 10~3-;)4) 
Again, the Court in concluding there was no such 
conduct h~- Green as to evidence a release of Garns 
said: 
·'Green never entered into a new contract \vi th 
the purchasers of the Garns' interests." (Ibid p. 
1054) 
Nor <lid Olsen ever enter into a new agreement 
with the purchaser of Appellant's interest. The reason 
is clear. Olsen never intended to or did release Appel-
lant. 
CONCLeSION 
The evidenct> in this case led the learned Trial 
Court inexorably to its Conclusion and Judgment in 
in this matter. The Court bottomed that Judgment on 
sound facts and acted within its judicial prerogatives 
with discretion and candor. The Trial Court's Judg-
ment should he affirmed. 
I~espectfully Submitt~d, 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
L. Rrent Hoggan 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
